NA by Moessner, Paul C.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1972













1961 - JUNE 1971
Paul C. .Moessner




mamauzi, cali* . 93*40
Page
PREFACE i
CHAPTER I. HISTORICAL SETTING 1
CHAPTER II. BERLIN AS VIEWED FROM WASHINGTON 4





In recent years, it has become a popular pastime for laymen and
and academicians alike to debate the continuing nature of the Cold War.
However, whether the debaters support the thesis that the Cold War has
ended, or favor views that it has been temporarily recessed, or even that
the Cold War is still going strong in some quiet new phase, there is little
disagreement that some major issues remain stamped "pending." One such
issue is the status of Berlin, (East-West) Germany. At no other spot on
the globe are forces of the United States in such close and potentially
hostile proximity to the forces of the Soviet Union nor joined over an
issue of such overriding national interest to both states. Even the recent
contact of NATO and Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea provides
greater latitude of political-military maneuverability for Western policy
makers than does the Berlin situation. As the decade of the 1970's begins,
the question of how best to lengthen the Berlin fuse is again being dis-
cussed.
This paper examines the Berlin situation in two contexts. The first
is a review of Berlin's significance to American foreign policy during
the period 1961-1971. I have purposely limited this part of the paper to
Berlin's role as seen by the President, since the President is the indi-
vidual charged with the responsibility of determining America's foreign
policy. The second context in which the Berlin question is examined is
its relationship to the relatively recent (1966) foreign policy emphasis
of the Federal Republic of Germany to seek detente with its East European
neighbors. That policy, termed Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy), has produced
some dramatic developments within the period 1969-1971, and the success





In the early hours of August 13, 1961, combat units of the Socialist
Unity Party and members of the Volkspolizei (Peoples Police) under the
protective cover of Soviet zonal police forces began the preliminary work
which culminated in the erection of the Berlin Wall. This action did not
mark the beginning of a new crisis, but rather the final (albeit desperate)
phase of an old one. The crisis which was in its waning days had begun
officially on November 27, 1958, when Nikita S. Khrushchev threatened to
sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany if the remaining abnormal-
ity of World War II, the occupation status of Berlin, could not be
resolved within six months.
Khrushchev left no doubt as to his interpretation of what such a
treaty would mean for the Western Allies: negotiation for access rights
into the city with East Germany (prospects for successfully negotiating
such rights being nil) , and war with the Warsaw Pact if the West tried to
bulldoze its way past the regime of Walter Ulbricht. This was not a
particularly new threat; not new, that is, until the six-month ultimatum
was inserted. The action-forcing tactic of appending time limit con-
straints had not been a feature of previous Soviet efforts to change the
status quo in Berlin.
There followed in the nearly three years after the Khrushchev note of
1958 a series of events which either resulted directly from the new Soviet
initiative vis-a-vis Berlin or which would materially effect the outcome
of the crisis: a visit by Khrushchev to President Eisenhower's Camp
Ulam, Adam B. , Expansion & Coexistence : The History of Soviet Foreign
Policy 1917-67, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1968, p. 620.

David retreat, a change in leadership at the United States Department of
State, retractions and restatements of the "six-month ultimatum," two
summit meetings (one of which was aborted) , a change in political leader-
ship in the United States, and most significantly an unprecedented mass
exodus of Germans from the German Democratic Republic.
The flight of East Germans into Western sectors of Berlin and the
Federal Republic of Germany had been going on since the end of World War
II. However, with the Soviet threat to sign a separate peace treaty with
Walter Ulbricht the implications to any Germans who still wished to leave
the GDR were quite clear: get out while a border opening still remained.
The numbers of refugees grew exponentially. In 1959, 78,406 applied for
emergency admission to the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1960, the
number grew to 102,842. During the first seven months of 1961, 63,061
were processed through the refugee center in Berlin-Marienfelde. In
August, 1961, 47,433 reached refugee camps in West Berlin, Ulzen, and
2
Giessen. Total figures for those seeking a new home in the West are
impossible to obtain since many refugees never checked through one of the
receiving stations. Estimates run close to the four million mark for the
period 1945-1961, two and one-half million of those escaping during the
3
twelve years prior to the erection of the Wall.
Numbers alone do not tell the full story of the effect of the
emigration on the GDR. The drain of skilled labor, youth, and
2
Ulbricht 's Wall: Figures, Facts, Dates , Federal Ministry for All-German
Affairs, Federal Republic of Germany, 1964, pp. 28-29.
3
Smith, Jean E. , The Defense of Berlin
,
The Johns Hopkins Press,
Baltimore, 1963, p. 2.

professional people was a serious threat to the future productivity, in-
4
deed, the survival of East Germany. The situation was rife with in-
stability, and the East German regime, following directives from Moscow,
took the steps necessary to protect its self interest—the Wall was built,
The effects were dramatic, immediate, and lasting; only a handful of
refugees have managed to escape since the end of August, 1961.
4
Ibid.
Khrushchev, Nikita S., Khrushchev Remembers , Little, Brown and Company,
Boston, 1970, pp. 452-460.

CHAPTER II
BERLIN AS VIEWED FROM WASHINGTON
Excluding the waning days of the Eisenhower Administration, three
Presidents of the United States have dealt with Berlin as a policy issue
during the period 1961-1971. However, only Presidents Kennedy and Nixon
have had to deal with the Berlin question on a level which inspired
political analysts of mass communications to speculate on the direction
which the policy would take. The Administration of Lyndon Baines Johnson
was able to deal with the Berlin question in a very low profile manner.
If one were to attempt some form of graphic presentation of this phenomenon,
using as a measure of public interest such things as Presidential utter-
ances, government publications, and newspaper editorials, the result would
be a slightly distended, inverted bell curve. The curve would drop
sharply in early 1962, and begin a recovery climb at the end of 1968. A
finding of this sort prompts a number of questions: what was at stake in
terms of American foreign policy in the early Kennedy period? What
changes in policy emphasis and what events occurred to cause a decline in
the visible Presidential interest in the Berlin issue? And finally, what
change in policy emphasis and what events caused Berlin to resurface as a
visible area of Presidential concern? This chapter will examine those
questions.
A note of caution is necessary, however. Because this study examines
a period of contemporary history, the conclusions drawn may be more
apparent than real as a result of the better than even chance that
significant data which could alter the conclusions is not available either
for reasons of national security or the personal preference of individuals
in possession of such data.

President Kennedy and Berlin
When President Kennedy took office in January, 1961, the "peace-
treaty-ultimatum" crisis in Berlin had been underway for over two years.
Even before his election, Kennedy's policy inclination on Berlin was quite
clear. In July, 1960, he had announced on the television program Meet The
Press that he felt America should make it plain to Khrushchev that no
amount of pressure would shake U.S. commitment to carry out long-
established obligations in Berlin. The last six months of 1960 were
relatively quiet in Berlin, Khrushchev having apparently decided to wait
until the new President took the reins of government before making new
initiatives. Even though the Soviet Premier's menacing remarks concerning
the link between his personal prestige and a settlement on Berlin were
made during the last days of the Eisenhower Presidency, there is little
doubt that they were intended for consumption by the incoming American
2Chief Executive.
Once in office, Kennedy moved to assess more fully the Western com-
mitments to Berlin and the wherewithal to carry through on them. The
initial steps involved a request for an appraisal of the situation in
Berlin from former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and a review of
defense capabilities by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Within a
few months, it became apparent that the Acheson report and the McNamara
findings dovetailed neatly, however the results which could be expected
if the Berlin crisis deepened would be an exchange of nuclear weapons
Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. , A Thousand Days
, Houghton Mifflin Company,




6between Russia and the United States. The Acheson memorandum opted for a
no-compromise, no-negotiation, fight-if-we-have-to posture. The McNamara
findings indicated that the profound majority of the Western military eggs
were in the nuclear basket. Contingency plans for a military confronta-
tion with the Soviets over Berlin provided for almost no intermediate
steps between declaration of emergency and Presidential authorization for
nuclear delivery.
The dangers inherent in the massive retaliation formula of national
defense had been cited many times by Kennedy. On October 16, 1959, in
Lake Charles, Louisiana, Kennedy spoke of the need for conventional
4
weapons and a limited, non-nuclear war capability in the atomic age. In
that speech he mentioned specifically the serious reduction in our
capacity to deal effectively with Berlin crises as a result of the draw
down of military manpower begun in 1954.
So, in 1961, the President reaffirmed his earlier convictions of the
need for a flexible response capability by means of the McNamara inquiry.
Even before Kennedy's meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna in June, 1961, the
President had begun the process of shifting the emphasis of American
military power away from an undue reliance on nuclear deterrence.
The Berlin crisis provided a real-life situation to dramatize the
necessity for a nation's possession of a flexible response capability.
Of the three crises in 1961: Laos, Bay of Pigs Cuba and Berlin, the
3
Ibid
. , p. 388. See also Sorensen, Theodore C, Kennedy , Harper and Row,
New York, 1965, p. 588.
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Berlin affair proved the most effective tool for exerting leverage to
obtain popular and Congressional support for the shift to a flexible
response defense posture. If the crisis in Berlin were to deteriorate
into a shooting war, all of the elements of the President's program for
shifting away from an all-or-nothing (nuclear weapons-or-surrender)
strategy would play significant roles. In consonance with that possibility,
the efforts to sell Congress on the budgetary increases required for such
a program consistently linked the shift in defense posture with the threat
in Berlin. At the same time, however, those who testified before Congress
were careful to point out that the new defense program was not tailored
exclusively to the Berlin situation, but rather provided the President
with a greater range of military alternatives to meet crises anywhere in
the world. Another of the strengths of Berlin as a lever for adoption of
the new defense program was the simple fact that the United States was
already committed to the defense of Berlin. Although the we-owe-it-to-
the-boys-at-the-front aspect was not explicitly pursued, it was implicit
in the discussions concerning the staying power of forces in Europe should
the Soviet Union launch a concerted conventional weapons offensive.
The Administration's carefully orchestrated campaign to win support
for a flexible response military inventory was not Machiavellian in
nature. That so many of the attributes of the Berlin crisis dovetailed
neatly into the campaign was no mere coincidence. Berlin was the point
at which U.S. and Soviet armed forces stood muzzle-to-muzzle, and was
therefore the place where military confrontation could most logically
be expected to occur. With a military plan which leapfrogged from
provocation to nuclear exchange, the results would be disastrous. Neither

8Laos nor Cuba, in 1961, could claim so many positive attributes for
adoption of a flexible response capability.
Theodore Sorensen contends that the President did not finalize plans
for dealing with renewed Soviet pressure on Berlin until after the Vienna
meeting. Two crucial decisions were not made until the middle of July.
The first dealt with a choice of accepting or rejecting the Acheson
paper's recommendation against suggesting negotiations on the Berlin
question; the second with the most effective method of employing flexible
military response to future hostile Soviet initiatives in Berlin. Both
issues were resolved at a meeting of the National Security Council on
July 19th. The President chose to reject Acheson' s recommendation
against negotiations, asserting that the United States should take the
lead in suggesting a negotiated settlement. Such a move would gain a
propaganda advantage, and would simultaneously soften the rather harsh
tone of the President's upcoming (July 25th) television address on the
subject of Berlin. Flexible response would be applied in several ways.
The President would dispatch additional troops to Germany, transit rights
into West Berlin would be tested by sending re-enforcements to the Berlin
garrison, increased draft calls and a limited activation of reserve units
would be requested, and, if necessary, the President would not shrink
from the use of nuclear weapons to defend Western interests in West
Berlin.
It is essential to this analysis to enumerate Western interests in









gave any new interpretation to these interests. The objectives which
Kennedy sought to uphold were as follows: U.S. presence in West Berlin,
U.S. access to West Berlin, and freedom of West Berliners to choose their
own polxtxcal system.
The interests expressed were essentially the same as those claimed
by the Western Allies ever since the end of World War II. Perhaps be-
cause the July 25th speech was geared specifically to American rights with
respect to Berlin, the rights of German civilian traffic into and through-
out Berlin were not stressed. The only hint of change in emphasis in the
Kennedy approach as compared to that of the Eisenhower-Dulles response to
the Soviet initiative of November, 1958, was Kennedy's stronger emphasis
on the word West in West Berlin. This factor is noteworthy, however, in
view of the U.S. response to the building of the Wall, a response which
argued that the Wall was not a cause for war since rights of the Western
allies were not infringed upon. As a policy issue, German civilian
access to West Berlin did not appear again to any significant degree
until Richard Nixon became President.
With the construction of the Wall underway (a move which caught
9
Washington by surprise) Kennedy tested Soviet intentions by dispatching
fifteen hundred U.S. troops into Berlin via surface access routes. To
bolster sagging West Berlin morale, Kennedy sent Vice-President Johnson
and General Lucius Clay to the city as his personal representatives, and







, pp. 593-594, and Schlesinger, op_. cit
. , pp. 394-395.

10
famous "Ich bin ein Berliner" speech nearly two years later would serve
the same purpose— to assure West Berliners that the U.S. would not desert
them. Beyond that there was nothing that could be done short of provoking
war with the Soviet Union. Tension was at a high level, but gradually
dwindled as the year ended without a move by Khrushchev to sign a separate
peace treaty with Walter Ulbricht. However, that did not make Berlin any
less dangerous as a potential for confrontation. That Berlin remained high
on America's list of places to watch for probes from the East is evidenced
by the significant placement which it received in the scenario writings of
the President's advisors during the Cuban missile crisis.
Two beneficial spin-offs resulted from the Berlin crisis of 1958-
1961. First, President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev both had an op-
portunity to get the measure of their opposite number's tolerance level
for swift shifts of balance in international power politics. It is dif-
ficult to over-estimate the importance which this factor played in the
decisions made during the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962. Second,
the Berlin crisis must have added further to the conviction on the
President's part of the need for rapid communication equipment between
the White House and the Kremlin. Although the "hot line" was not in-
stalled until after the Cuban crisis, Theodore Sorensen makes it clear
that discussions on such equipment had been in progress since the first
12
months of the Kennedy Administration. Indeed, the first solid word
Sorensen, Ibid










that the President had concerning the Soviet's intentions to let things
cool down in Berlin came not by official diplomatic channels, but rather
by a word-of-mouth relay from Mikhail Kharlamov, (press chief for the
Soviet Foreign Ministry) through Pierre Salinger (President Kennedy's
13
Press Secretary) to the President. A similar exchange occurred during
14
the heigh th of tension during the Cuban crisis of 1962.
If the Berlin crisis of 1958-1961 had spin-offs of positive value,
it also produced some negative results from Washington's point of view.
Perhaps the most disturbing of these debits was the attitude of the United
States' NATO partners regarding the President's formula for settlement of
the immediate crisis. Kennedy had based his solution on a combination of
military preparedness and negotiation. None of the Alliance partners in
Europe followed the American lead in conventional forces build-up to the
extent which Washington considered adequate, and the issue of negotiations
with the Russians presented a serious threat to the unanimity of the NATO
voice. The first split NATO communique in history was a result of the
negotiations issue; the French provided the negative vote when Kennedy
decided to proceed as a self-appointed agent to explore with Moscow the
I C.
possibility of a basis for further talks on Berlin. The divergence of
13
Salinger, Pierre, With Kennedy , Doubleday & Company, Garden City, 1966,
pp. 189-194.
14
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, J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia









opinion within NATO, the split vote on negotiations, and the lack of co-
ordination of the NATO military effort were things which disturbed
President Kennedy deeply. This was particularly true since he was of the
opinion that one of Krushchev's motives for exerting pressure on Berlin
was to split NATO into an ineffective and bickering household. This
Khrushchev objective was partially realized, but it would be an over-
exaggeration to say that the split would not have come if the Berlin
crisis had not been precipitated. The seeds of dissent within the Atlantic
Alliance were present long before 1961, and the subsequent Cuban crisis of
1962 did more to polarize points of view within NATO than did Berlin.
In summary, the Berlin crisis of 1958-1961 ushered in a watershed in
American foreign policy. The decisions made and the plans implemented
during the latter phases of that crisis set the tone for the conduct of
American affairs abroad for nearly a decade. Prior to 1961, positions of
power between the United States and the Soviet Union were frozen in a mold
which allowed little or no room for maneuver, a condition which defied
change without war. The tenor set by Kennedy's approach to a solution of
the Berlin crisis was one which: recognized the imperfection of frozen
positions; provided for latitude of response to probes at America's points
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President Johnson and Berlin
By comparison with the Kennedy Administration, there is little that
can be said of President Johnson's handling of the Berlin question. The
reason for this is quite simple: Berlin was not where the action was
during the period 1963-1968. Only once during the five-year period of the
Johnson Administration did anything remotely approaching crisis proportions
occur in Berlin. From April until July, 1965, East German and Soviet
military units conducted sporadic harassment of air corridor and Autobahn
traffic between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. However, Moscow's
treatment of the situation generally sought to minimize speculation that a
general Berlin crisis was in the making, as illustrated by the Pravda com-
ment that the measures taken were only meant to serve notice of protest
19
against meetings of the West German Bundestag in West Berlin.
The question of why Berlin became a sort of cold storage issue from
1963 until 1968 has two answers. First, the modus vivendi worked out by
Kennedy and Khrushchev as a result of the 1958-1961 crisis proved satis-
factory even after the sudden changes in political leadership in both the
United States and the Soviet Union. Second, both the United States and
the Soviet Union were forced to turn their attention to crises in the Far
East, an occurrence contrary to the historic dynamics of both countries.
Neither Washington nor Moscow showed any interest in compounding Asian
problems with efforts at making adjustments to the status quo in Europe
which would upset the modus vivendi.
19
Wolfe, Thomas W. , Soviet Power and Europe: 1945-1970, 1945-1970
,
The
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1970, p. 284n.
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During the period in which President Johnson held office, there were
only a few occasions on which he spoke of the Berlin question. These few
utterances by the President usually linked Berlin with the importance of
NATO, the search for detente between East and West in Europe, and the
solution of the German question. The specific issues involved in each of
these areas of American concern are in many ways quite separate. But in
one way they have a common meeting ground: the commitment and the
credibility thereof of the United States and the security of Western
Europe. As the time line following the 1961 Berlin crisis lengthened, the
air of urgency concerning future crises in the city decreased and was
reflected by dearth of presidential comment on the status of the city.
The dual trend—linking Berlin with the overall United States commitment
to European security, and the decline in crisis atmosphere—is borne out
in the following summary of President Johnson's public remarks in the period
1963-1968.
In December, 1965, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Ludwig Erhard, visited the White House. During the exchange of official
greetings, toasts at a State Dinner, and in the final joint communique of
the meeting, the President stressed the link between the freedom of Berlin,
the resolution of the German question as a whole, the strength of NATO,
and the need for a general detente in Eastern Europe. Only on one occasion
during that visit did the President speak directly to the Berlin issue.
At the State Dinner he asked and answered the question of America's commit-
ment to the freedom of West Berlin by saying that if America's word was no
good on Viet Nam, how could it be trusted with regard to Berlin. His




fronts. In New York City, on October 7, 1966, the President addressed
the National Conference of Editorial Writers. In that address, Johnson
made special note of two anniversaries: the ending of the Berlin Airlift
of 1948-1949, and the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Both of
these anniversaries, according to the President, were possible because of
21
the existence of a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On
August 15 and 16, 1967, Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger visited Washington. In
all of the communications resulting from that meeting, mention of NATO was
22
much in evidence, but the Berlin topic did not appear once.
Since no major conference of Foreign Ministers or summit meeting of
Heads of State convened to discuss the Berlin issue during the Johnson
Administration, there is little doubt that both Johnson and the Soviet
leadership were content to leave Berlin on a back burner at low heat for
an unspecified length of time.
President Nixon and Berlin
Scarcely more than one month after taking office, President Richard
Nixon began a trip to Europe to emphasize America's faith in the purposes
and strengths of the Atlantic Alliance. The trip was restricted to the
capitals of the major NATO partners—with one exception: Berlin!
On February 27, 1969, President Nixson arrived at Templehof Air Force
Base in West Berlin. In a speech made after reviewing elements of the
20
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, Volume 2, Number 41.
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Ibid. , Volume 3, Number 33.
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United States garrison in Berlin, he made special note of the fact that
this was the first unit of American Armed Forces stationed abroad which he
23
had reviewed in his role as Commander In Chief. Nixon also played on an
old and crucial theme, the importance of the courage and tenacity of West
Berliners in the maintenance of a free Berlin. The President referred to
this in most complimentary terms by giving it the appelation of "the Fifth
Power" in Berlin (the other four being the U.S., France, Great Britain, and
the U.S.S.R.) 24
In the course of that same day, the President made three more speeches
throughout the city. At the Chariot tenburg Palace, for official welcoming
ceremonies with city officials, Nixon stressed the solidarity of the
American government with the aspirations of West Berliners to remain free
from Communist domination. At the huge Siemans factory, he issued a warn-
ing to any aggressors who might have plans for undoing the American policy
of protecting West Berlin. In the same speech, however, he stressed the
point that the status quo in Berlin was not a desirable end in itself.
Finally, in a short departure speech at Tegel airport, Nixon repeated some-
thing which he had said in Bonn the day before his Berlin visit. He
25
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In similar addresses in Bonn, Nixon reaffirmed the West's position of be-
ing ready to talk with the Soviets on a Berlin settlement.
None of the points which President Nixon stressed were new additions
to Western policy regarding Berlin. However, the issue of Berlin's
political ties with the Federal Republic had not been addressed by an
American President during the decade of the Sixties. This factor was of
importance to the governments of both the Federal Republic and GDR. For
Ulbricht's regime, the political ties between Berlin and the Federal
Republic had always been (and continues to be) the most repugnant of the
unsettled issues concerning the city. Nixon's announced resolve on that
issue meant two things for the leadership in East Berlin. First, the West
was not going to brook continued harassment of Federal Republic political
delegations traveling to and from Berlin. Western occupation forces could
not stop such harassment, but diplomatic pressure could and would be
27
applied on the Soviet Union to control Ulbricht. This Presidential
action reintroduced the issue of West German civilian transit rights to
and from Berlin, an issue which had not been raised to such prominence
since the period preceding the 1958-1961 crisis. Second, the East Berlin
regime would be forced to deal with Bonn on a political basis if there was
to be any hope of a settlement of the Berlin problem.
For the Federal Republic, the President's messages carried the assur-
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as a bargaining tool if the Soviet Union decided to enter into negotiations
on the status of Berlin at some future date.
When the President's several speeches were viewed as a package, a
definite shift in policy emphasis—not content—could be discerned. This
shift dealt with the German question as a whole, and was reflective of
changes which had occurred within the Federal Republic. With the retire-
ment of Konrad Adenauer, the original cold warrior of West Germany, from
active political life, the Federal Republic began seeking detente with
Eastern Europe. The United States gave quiet approval to the shift in the
Federal Republic's foreign policy. No immediate gains were expected to
result from the West German policy shift, and indeed, none occurred. Willy
Brandt, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic during the early period
of the Ostpolitik approach, frankly admitted that the West Germans had
an awesome international public relations chore ahead of them if the new
j 28policy were to succeed.
By the time President Nixon occupied the White House, the Federal
Republic was making significant strides in the direction of detente with
its Eastern neighbors (with the exception of East Germany) . The time was
ripe for Washington to shift from quiet approval to some positive expres-
sion of support for Ostpolitik . A move of this sort could have the
effect of getting the East Germans started on the road to talks with Bonn,
and consequently ease both the pressures on Berlin and the tension between
East and West. It is precisely this sort of shift which could be read
into the President's package of speeches in Bonn and Berlin in February
Brandt, Willy, A Peace Policy for Europe , Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
New York, 1969, pp. 1-30.
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1969. Certainly a conclusion of this sort is within the realm of pos-
sibility since President Nixon's inaugural address, given only a month be-
fore the European junket, stressed the need for an era of negotiation in-
stead of confrontation.
In the two years since the President visited the Federal Republic,
the developments resulting from Ostpolitik have been breathtaking. Initi-
ally, when the United States became actively involved in the wider
ramifications of Ostpolitik (the opening of Four Power discussions on the
future status of Berlin) , Washington gave hearty praise to the efforts of
Willy Brandt. Since March of 1970, however, the Administration has remained
relatively quiet on its feelings concerning the rapidity of Ostpolitik
developments. Speculation from the quasi-private sector, however, has not
been lacking.
In January, 1971, a brusque exchange of open letters in the New York
Times between Arthur Goldberg, former United States Ambassador to the
United Nations, and George Ball, former Under Secretary of State, presented
the pros and cons of why the United States should or should not continue to
29
let Brandt proceed unchecked. Goldberg argued that former highly-placed
foreign policy officials (George Ball, Dean Acheson, General Lucius Clay,
and Ambassador John J. McCloy) should cease voicing opposition to Brandt's
Ostpolitik
,
because the German Chancellor is only doing what the United
States has been forcing Germany to do for years— facing the facts of the
situation (a divided Germany of indefinite duration) . Goldberg went on to
29
Goldberg, Arthur J., "The Cold Warriors vs Willy Brandt," New York Times
,
January 5, 1971.
Ball, George, "A Reply to Arthur Goldberg," New York Times , January 8, 1971.
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point out that, lacking denials from the White House, detractors of the
stature of those he named had sufficient prestige to give foreign govern-
ments the impression that they were defining U.S. policy. This, according
to Goldberg, was highly irresponsible activity.
The Ball reply correctly pointed out that the Soviet Union was intel-
ligent enough to know that private citizens, regardless of stature, did
not speak for the United States government. Ball continued by denegrating
Ostpolitik as reckless and too hasty; he preferred to wait and see what
results came out of the Four Power talks on Berlin's future status. If
the Russians were serious about detente, Ball surmised, they would be ready
to make concessions on Berlin.
Neither President Nixon nor his White House staff commented directly
on the New York Times articles. The reasons for this executive silence
could have been many and varied. Perhaps, as Arthur Goldberg might sug-
gest, George Ball and his colleagues were voicing sentiments which the
President agreed with. Perhaps the Four Power talks on Berlin had reached
a critical stage which required no rocking of the boat. Perhaps the
President, knowing that the Soviet Union does not consider the words of
private citizens to be definitive statements of government policy, simply
chose to ignore the Goldberg-Ball exchange.
While direct comment on the Ball-Goldberg exchange was not forthcoming
from the White House, there were, during the same time period, indications
that some reappraisal of U.S. support for Brandt's Ostpolitik may be in the
offing. Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger expressed personal reserva-
30tions about Brandt's policy to visiting diplomats and newsmen. This
30
Smith, Terence, "Foreign Policy: Ebbing of Power at the State Department"
in United States Foreign Policy in the Nixon Administration
,
The New York
Times Co., New York, 1971, p. 3.
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pronouncement brought an emissary from the Federal Republic of Germany
rushing to Washington for consultations. When he left, however, the West
German expressed confidence that everything was again in order. What was
said during the German envoy's visit to the White House is, of course, not
known. However, the Administration's recent massive efforts to squelch
passage of the Mansfield troop reduction amendment may give some clue.
The thrust of the Nixon Administration's argument against the
Mansfield amendment was the danger inherent in a unilateral relaxation of
vigalence vis-a-vis the still present Communist threat to Western Europe
—
and the West in general. Troop reductions without similar moves by the
Soviet Union would have meant several things. First, military readiness
within NATO would have been reduced to an intolerable level. Second, one
of the most effective bargaining chips in the search for East-West detente
would have been lost. Third, and most importantly, unilateral troop with-
drawals would have dealt a severe blow to the credibility of America's com-
mitment to European security. It is no wonder then that the Nixon Admini-
stration mounted such an overwhelming offensive against passage of the
amendment, using quite purposefully a host of "Europe Firsters" to lobby
the measure into defeat. The appearance of such notables as Dean Acheson,
Lucius Clay, John McCloy, and Goerge Ball must have been as much for the
reassurance of jittery Europeans as for the actual lobbying task.
Thus, the German emissary may have been reminded that while Ostpolitik
is essentially a unilateral move on the part of the Federal Republic, the
ramifications of the policy impact a much larger geographical and political
area than just that of West Germany. One of those areas of impact is the
inextricable relationship of American and West European security. In the

22
same way that President Nixon attacked domestic threats to that relation-
ship, it could be expected that he would work as hard for the continuance
of that relationship when even the remotest hints of a crack in solidarity
appeared on the other side of the Atlantic.
The Nixon Administration is apparently following the maxim—and urging
Congress and its European allies to do likewise—of seeking detente, but
not at a reckless pace which, to use George Ball's phrase, confuses the
31
wish with the fact. As of June, 1971, President Nixon is content to wait
for Berlin negotiations to demonstrate whether detente is, in fact, a wish
or a fact.
31
Ball, George W. , "Exit the Cold Warrior?" Newsweek , February 8, 1971.

CHAPTER III
BERLIN AND EAST-WEST DETENTE IN EUROPE
In the years since the post-World War II occupation of Berlin was
established, Western resolve to maintain a presence in the city has been
the object of periodic probes by the Soviet Union and the German Democratic
Republic. As such, the West has been perpetually on the defensive. This
defensive posture has even been borne out in the terminology used to
describe Berlin's role within the framework of international power politics,
Phrases such as "outpost of freedom," "glass window," "tripwire," "baro-
meter of changing political pressure," and others reflect the fact that
attempts to affect a change in the status of Berlin have meant programs of
reaction vice initiative for the West.
In 1970, a shift occurred which balanced the old, but still valid,
defensive posture with an element of offense. The new role could best
be described as "political lever." That appellation should not be inter-
preted as being synonymous with "bargaining point." While bargaining con-
notes some measure of retreat from a previously nonnegotiable position,
leverage connotes a method of goal attainment without yielding current
holdings.
Berlin's new role is based primarily on two political developments:
the apparent successes of the West German government's Ostpolitik
(Eastern Policy) , and the agreement by the occupying nations in Berlin
to reopen discussions on the future status of the city. This chapter
will investigate the origins, development, and implications of these two
causal factors.
As a political term, Ostpolitik did not gain currency until Willy
Brandt became Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1966.
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It would be a mistake, however, to assume that contacts designed to relax
tension between the Federal Republic and the countries of Eastern Europe
were not undertaken before Brandt took over the Foreign Ministry. Under
Gerhard Schroeder, Foreign Minister in cabinets both of Konrad Adenauer
and Ludwig Erhard, arrangements regarding commercial intercourse were
made with the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia. Yet these arrangements always stopped short of the
measures which distinguish Brandt's new Ostpolitik—i.e., the establishment
of diplomatic relations and the willingness to discuss the non-negotiable
issues of the Adenauer era.
The reason for West Germany 's isolation from East European capitals
during the period before Brandt became Foreign Minister was the Hallstein
Doctrine, a creation of the heyday of the Cold War (1955), which stated
the Federal Republic's intention to sever diplomatic ties with any state
2
that recognized the regime in East Germany.
In March, 1966, the Erhard government offered to enter negotiations
with the Warsaw Pact countries on an agreement for the mutual renuncia-
tion of force in the conduct of international affairs. This attempt to
break the icy atmosphere was rejected by the Kremlin in a note dated May
Heidenheimer, Arnold J., The Governments of Germany , Thomas Y. Crowell
Company, New York, 1966, p. 230.
2
Hubatsch, Walter (ed.), The German Question , Herder Book Center, New




19, 1966. That exchange of notes was the last on the subject of detente
until the Grand Coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats
came to power in West Germany in December, 1966.
On December 13, 1966, the new Chancellor, Kurt Kiesinger, renewed
the offer to negotiate on the renunciation of force agreement, and in-
cluded in the statement an unprecedented offer to discuss the unresolved
4
problem of a divided Germany. If one had to date the birth of the new
era of Ostpolitik , it would have to be this offer to converse on the
sacrosanct issue of the existence of two Germanies. In the December 13
policy statement, the Federal Republic was not giving up its claim to be
the only legitimate representative of the German people, but it demon-
strated a clear willingness to bend, if not break, the Hallstein
Doctrine. The Warsaw Pact rejected the West German initiative, and, in
the spring of 1967, the Eastern bloc proclaimed its own version of the
Hallstein Doctrine. The Warsaw Pact move was somewhat analogous to the
closing of the barn door after the horse had run away since Rumania had
entered into full diplomatic relations with West Germany in February, 1967.'
3
Hess, Herbert, "Brandt's 'small steps' policy led to treaty signing,"
Suddesutsche Zeitung
,
August 8, 1970, Munich, West Germany. This cita-
tion and other German press citings are taken from The German Tribune
,
a weekly review of the German press, Friedrich Reinecke Verlag GmbH.,
Hamburg, West Germany. This citation from August 27, 1970, p. 6. All
following citations will be referred to as T.G.T.
4
Ibid.
Fischer-Galti, Stephen, "The Socialist Republic of Rumania" in Toma,
Peter A. , The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe
, The University
of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1970, p. 32.

26
In light of the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in August,
1968, (with the assistance of Poland, Hungary, and the German Democratic
Republic) Ostpolitik became a campaign issue in the West German elections
of 1969. Recognizing that quantum jumps in a search for detente with
Eastern Europe were unrealistic, Brandt, nevertheless, defended the need
for a policy of reconciliation. In an address before a trades union
congress on September 2, 1969, the head of the Social Democratic Party
maintained that, "Small steps are better than none and small steps are
more than big words."
The elections in the Federal Republic brought an end to the Grand
Coalition, Brandt and Kiesinger having grown poles apart on the issue of
Ostpolitik . The voice of the electrorate seemed to support Brandt's
willingness to more actively pursue a relaxation of tensions with the East,
Shortly after forming a new government in coalition with the small
Free Democratic Party, Chancellor Brandt issued a policy statement which
included a renewed offer to the Warsaw Pact to enter negotiations on a
mutual renunciation of force. The new offer was identical to the one
issued by Kiesinger in December, 1966. Yet on this occasion, the Soviet
Union chose to accept the invitation; preliminary talks got under way on
December 8, 1969. Brandt, meeting with United States Secretary of State
William Rogers less than a week before the talks with Moscow began,
received strong encouragement to reach an agreement with the Soviets from
Hess, Herbert, op. cit
., p. 6.
Supplement to The Bulletin
,
a weekly survey of German affairs published
by the Press and Information Office of the Government of the Federal




President Nixon. The Secretary of State also announced, while in Bonn,
that the three Western powers who maintained occupation garrisons in
Berlin would soon propose to the Soviet Union that negotiations be started
9
with the aim of improving the status of Berlin. In another move to sup-
port Brandt's search for a modus vivendi with Moscow, the NATO Foreign
Ministers meeting in Brussels, issued a statement indicating that suc-
cessful conclusion of the Bonn-Moscow talks would "substantially facili-
tate cooperation between East and West on other problems."
The statements of Brandt and the Western allies provided unmistakable
evidence that the East would have to negotiate simultaneous solutions to
the problems of Berlin's future and European security. In other words,
the Soviet Union would not be able to realize a treaty with the Federal
Republic without demonstrating good faith on the Berlin issue.
With the preliminary discussions completed, Egon Bahr, Federal
Republic State Secretary, departed for Moscow where work began on the
draft of a renunciation of force treaty on January 27, 1970. Within six
weeks, the Soviet Union also agreed to enter into negotiations with the
United States, Great Britain, and France on the Berlin question.
While talks with the Soviet Union progressed through the spring of
1970, the Bonn and East Berlin governments held the first top-echelon
discussions since the division of Germany. Willy Brandt presented a
twenty-point basis for discussion of a treaty to normalize relations with
o







the Democratic Republic. The conditions set down by Bonn constituted a
highly sophisticated formula for de facto recognition of the East German
regime. Two meetings of the heads of government were held, one at
Erfurt in the GDR and the other at Kassel in the Federal Republic. Willi
Stoph, East German Premier, refused to consider the Bonn proposal and
took an all-or-nothing stand on the issue of diplomatic recognition.
According to obervers in West Germany, the meetings proved that the
German Democratic Republic still took its orders directly from the Kremlin;
this conclusion was based on the quick trip by GDR leadership to Moscow on
12
the eve of the Kassel conference. Following the second meeting of Willy
Brandt and Willi Stoph, East Berlin declared that there would be a "pause
for thought." That was interpreted as meaning that the talks had come to
an indefinite halt, an interpretation which proved to be correct.
While the talks between the two Germanies foundered and the Four
Power talks demonstrated no breakthroughs, the negotiations in Moscow on
a treaty of nonaggression also proceeded fitfully. However, in August,
1970, the West Germans and the Russians reached a formula acceptable to
both sides. Amid great fanfare, the treaty was signed in Moscow by
13
Chancellor Brandt and Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin on August 12.
Schuster, Hans, "Stoph Adopts All-or-Nothing Attitude," Suddeutsche
Zeitung
,
May 22, 1970, Munich, West Germany in T.G.T. June 4, 1970, p. 2.
12




May 21, 1970, Lubeck, West Germany in T.G.T . June 4, 1970, p.
3.
13
A complete coverage of the events surrounding the signing of the treaty
can be found in T.G.T. August 27, 1970, pp. 1-12, and in The Current Digest
of the Soviet Press , Volume XXII, Number 33, September 15, 1970, pp. 1-3,22
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Signing a treaty is one thing; ratifying a treaty is quite another
thing. During the course of negotiations, the Federal Republic advised
the Soviets on four occasions that the Bundestag (West German Parliament)
would not be asked to ratify the document until the Four Power talks on
Berlin reached satisfactory conclusions on the future of the city. The
Russians had tried to dodge the issue, but did not call the talks to a
14halt over the Federal Republic's resolve.
Shortly after the treaty with Bonn was signed, the Warsaw Pact held
a summit conference in Moscow. Walter Ulbricht was in a panic over what
could be interpreted by East Berlin as a sellout to Bonn by Moscow. The
emphasis of the conference was on peaceful coexistence, and Ulbricht was
advised to cooperate. The political isolation of the German Democratic
Republic became all the more evident when the Polish government signed a
friendship treaty with Bonn on November 18, 1970. The Bonn-Warsaw treaty
declared the acceptance by the Federal Republic of the inviolability of
the Oder-Neisse Line, a topic which was not even considered negotiable in
Bonn during the Adenauer era.
14
Koch, Dirk, "After Days of Uncertainty a Successful Conclusion,"
Stuttgarter Zeitung
,
August 8, 1970, Stuttgart, West Germany in T.G.T .
August 27, 1970, pp. 7-8.
Bolte, Emil, "Events Are Forcing Ulbricht to Accept Kassel 20 Points,"
Kolner Stadt-Anzeiger
,
August 24, 1970, Koln, West Germany in T.G.T.
September 3, 1970, p. 1.
Kinnigkeit, Willi, "Walter Ulbricht Breathes Hard Down Warsaw's Neck,"
Suddeutsche Zeitung , November 9, 1970, Munich, West Germany in T.G.T .
November 19, 1970, p. 1.
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In negotiating the treaty with Warsaw, Bonn included the proviso
that ratification would not be requested until the Berlin question was
solved. The use of Berlin as a lever in the Polish treaty was
significant since Poland was in no way responsible for the division of
the city or the hardships of the West Berliners which resulted from that
division. Neither was Poland a participant in the Four Power talks con-
cerning Berlin. The implication was clear that Bonn (and the West in
general) would muster support wherever it could be found within the
Warsaw Pact to exact concessions from the East Berlin regime.
As of June, 1971, the situation vis-a-vis the Four Power talks and,
consequently, the ratification of the treaties with Moscow and Warsaw has
reached a point of apparent stagnation. The West is still holding that
its demands for a Berlin solution remain unchanged: free access for West
Germans and Allied personnel into West Berlin on designated routes across
East German territory, recognition by the Soviet Union and East Germany
of West Berlin's economic, cultural, and legal ties with the Federal
Republic, and the right to maintain Federal Republic government offices
in the Western sectors of the city. The Soviet Union still maintains
that transit agreements across East German territory will have to be
legitimized by a treaty between the Western powers (including Bonn) and
the German Democratic Republic. The Soviet demand means that the West
will be obliged to grant East Berlin diplomatic recognition. The West
appears to be prepared to go as far as to grant de facto recognition




If the situation in Berlin remains unchanged from what it was be-
fore the Four Power talks began, of what value then is Berlin in a
political lever for the West? There is evidence to suggest that, in
fact, the leverage has worked in reverse. The East Germans have increased
Autobahn slow-downs during the past eighteen months, and those who feel
it most are the West Berliners. West Berlin morale— that Fifth Power
referred to by President Nixon in February, 1969—has suffered accord-
ingly. There is a very real fear that Bonn may be willing to leave West
Berlin to its own devices if the Soviets push hard enough for ratification
of the Bonn-Moscow treaty. This mood of resentment was demonstrated to
Willy Brandt, the West Berlin mayor during the 1961 crisis, when, in the
March, 1971 Berlin city elections, the Social Democrats (Brandt is the
party's leader) received only 50.4 percent of the votes cast. This was
a drop of over six percent since the elections of four years ago. Thus,
for West Berliners, there is doubt that a difference exists between the
terms "political lever" and "bargaining point."
On the other hand, there is evidence to indicate that the leverage
potential of Berlin is still real. The Soviet Union has demonstrated
that it is serious about wanting ratification of the treaty with Bonn.
Opposition to the treaty was evident in the Soviet Union, particularly
in the military press, right up to the day of signing. That opposition
was silenced by the Soviet leadership. Leonid Brezhnev, General
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, likewise rebuffed
(no author), "Soviet Internal Opposition to Moscow Treaty Silenced,"
Munchner Merkur , October 24, 1970, Munich, West Germany in T.G.T .




the Chinese Communist challenge to the advisability of the treat.
The Bonn-Moscow treaty represents a means to an end for the Kremlin.
The speculation as to what that end may be covers a number of fronts, all
or none of which may be correct. In discussing the significance of the
treaty, Brezhnev stressed the link between the agreement and a European
19
Security Conference. The Soviet Union has been calling for such a con-
ference for a long time, the results of which could be the eventual diso-
20
lution of NATO and the solidification of Soviet hegemony over Eastern
21
Europe. There are additional potential benefits which Moscow could
realize when the treaty is ratified. Moscow would gain more latitude to
deal with the Chinese and Middle East problems. The Soviet economy,
known to be suffering, could use the transfusion of German trade and
technical expertise to quite the clamor for consumer goods.
The question of whether or not the Soviet Union is ready to make con-
cessions on Berlin to get ratification of the Bonn-Moscow agreement has
yet to be answered. It is clear that the Kremlin is not adverse to play-
ing a waiting game. If the European Security Conference is really the
18
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ultimate goal of Moscow, it will no longer pay for them to continue that
tactic. If the Administration in Washington ordered sizeable reductions
in troop strength in Europe as a part of President Nixon's "realistic
deterrence" program, the Kremlin's perception of the need for a security
conference would pale, for it would have gotten all it could have
22
achieved at such a conference. However, with the defeat of the
Mansfield amendment, unilateral troop withdrawals have been precluded for
the time being.
The search for East-West detente in Europe can only be described as
incredibly complex. However, when all is said and done, the geographical
and political center of the search is in Berlin. The fact that the Four
Power talks have continued on a regular basis for more than a year indi-
cates that both sides consider it to their advantage to maintain
political contact even though a solution to the Berlin question may not
occur within the foreseeable future. A West German journalist summed up
the situation well when he wrote:
There they sit, the Americans, the Russians, the British
and French too, and the Germans, hating each other's guts,
playing poker with the Eastern policy as though they were
gathered together in a back room saloon in the Wild West.
Their expressions are tense. They bluff, lament and
occasionally thump their fists on the table. The stakes
are high, the game—which no longer warrants the name—is
risky. West Berlin, half a city, is at stake and no one has
all the aces in his hand. 23
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ADDENDUM
On September 3, 1971, the United States, France, Great Britain, and
the Soviet Union signed an agreement designed to ease tensions in Berlin.
This agreement was the first instrument of diplomacy concerning the
status of Berlin signed by the Four Powers since the agreement reached
in 1949 which lifted the Soviet blockade of the city. The main points of
the agreement are as follows:
1. Transit traffic of civilians and goods across the German
Democratic Republic between the Federal Republic of Germany
and West Berlin is to be unimpeded and facilitated so as to
take place in the most simple and expeditious manner and
that it will receive preferential treatment. Through
travelers using individual vehicles are to be exempt from
search or detention except for special procedures for sus-
pected misuse of through transit.
2. The Western powers commit themselves in exercising their
rights in West Berlin to maintain and develop the ties be-
tween those sectors and the Federal Republic of Germany and
also to continue to regard West Berlin as not part of the
Federal Republic and not governed by it.
3. Communication between West Berlin and areas of East Berlin
and the German Democratic Republic will be improved.
4. The right of the three Western powers to represent the in-
terests of West Berlin abroad are reaffirmed. Within limits
of security and in such a manner as not to prejudice the
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•rights of the Western powers, the Federal Republic of
Germany may perform services for residents of West Berlin,
and may represent the interests of West Berlin in international
organizations and conferences.
Of these general principles, specific arrangements for implementation
of the first three were to be worked out by representatives of the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. Negotiations of
this type are in progress as of October, 1971, however no draft protocol
has yet been presented for approval by the signatories of the basic agree-
ment. It is too early to forecast with any assurance the final outcome
of this diplomatic endeavor. The many things which hang on successful con-
clusion of an agreement on Berlin necessarily dictate a slow and careful
negotiating process for both the East and the West. The basic agreement
took eighteen months to reach the signature stage. It would not be sur-
prising if the talks between representatives of the GDR take at least as
long.
In one of his last published commentaries, the late Dean Acheson
counseled caution against overly hasty celebration of a breakthrough in
East-West relations. Few men have had the breadth of experience in
negotiating with the Soviets as the former Secretary of State, and his
words regarding the Berlin agreement seem a fitting conclusion to this
essay:
The Berlin agreement is no gift; nevertheless,
suspect those bearing it. Especially beware of the
euphoric fizz uncorked to celebrate* it.
*
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